Abstract-We formalise in a theorem prover the notion of provable anonymity proposed by Garcia et al. Our formalization relies on inductive definitions of message distinguish ability and observational equivalence over observed traces by the intruder. Our theory differs from its original proposal which essentially boils down to the existence of a reinterpretation function. We build our theory in Isabelle/HOL to have a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols. Its feasibility is illustrated through the onion routing protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of the Internet community and the rapid advances in technology over the past decades, people are getting used to carry out their daily activities through networked distributed systems providing electronic services to users. In these systems, people become more and more concerned about their privacy and how their personal information has been used. Typically, anonymity is a desired property of such systems, referring to the ability of a user to own some data or take some actions without being tracked down. This property is essential in systems that might involve sensitive personal data, like electronic auctions, voting, anonymous broadcasts, file-sharing etc. For example, users want to keep anonymous when they visit a particular web site or post their political opinions on a public bulletin board.
Due to its subtle nature, anonymity has been the subject of many theoretical studies and formal verification [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] . The proposed definitions aim to capture different aspects of anonymity (either possibilisticor probabilisticand formal verification treats systems in different application domains, such as electronic voting systems electronic cash protocols file sharing. However, automatic approaches to the formal verification of anonymity have mostly focused on the model checking approach on systems with fixed configurations [1] , while theorem proving is a more suitable approach when dealing with general systems of infinite state spaces. We address this situation by investigating the possibility of using a powerful general-purpose theorem prover, Isabelle/HOL [6] , to semi-automatically verify anonymity properties.
We start by formalising the notion of provable anonymity proposed by Garcia et al. [2] . Their key idea is to define observational equivalence between protocol traces. Two traces are to be considered equivalent if an intruder cannot distinguish them, i.e., he cannot find any meaningful difference. The distinguishing ability of the intruder is formalised as the ability to distinguish two messages, which is in turn based on message structures and relations between random looking messages. Central to their framework is the reinterpretation function proposed by Garcia et al. [2] . Proving two traces equivalent essentially boils down to the existence of such a reinterpretation function. Within their framework, Garcia et al. also define epistemic operators and use them to express information hiding properties like sender anonymity and unlinkability.
Our contribution: Our formalization of observational equivalence between traces relies on a definition of message distinguishability. Observational equivalence of traces is in the center of the epistemic framework -an agent knows a fact of a certain trace if that fact is true in all traces that are observationally equivalent to that trace. We build our theory in Isabelle/HOL [6] to have a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the mechanical framework through the onion routing protocol [7] . We inductively define the semantics of an onion routing protocol as a set of traces, and the relaying mechanism of the protocol is formally defined as a set of inductive rules. Furthermore, we formally prove that the protocol realizes anonymity properties such as sender anonymity and unlinkability under some circumstance by providing a method to construct an observationally equivalent onion trace for a given trace. To the best of our knowledge, theory of anonymity has not been formalised in a theorem prover yet. Our work aims to to bridge this gap. All lemmas in the paper are proved semi-automatically in Isabelle/HOL. Proofs are mostly omitted for the sake of brevity.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Agents, messages and events
Agents send or receive messages. There are three kinds of agents: the server, the friendly agents, and the spy. Formally the type of agent is defined as follows:
We use bad to denote the set of intruders, which at least includes the agent Spy. If an agent is not in bad, then is honest.
The set of messages is defined using the following BNF notation:
where is an element from agents, from natural numbers, and from natural numbers. Here we use −1 to denote the inverse key of . MPair ℎ 1 ℎ 2 is called a composed message. Crypt ℎ represents the encryption of message ℎ with . In an asymmetric key protocol model, an agent has a public key pubK , which is known to all agents, and a private key priK . pubK is the inverse key of priK , and vice versa. In a symmetric key model, each agent has a longterm symmetric key shrK . The inverse key of shrK is itself.
Two operators parts and analz are inductively defined on a message set . Their definition is taken from [8] and tailored for our purposes. Usually, contains a penetrator's initial knowledge and all messages sent by regular agents. The set parts is obtained from by repeatedly adding the components of compound messages and the bodies of encrypted messages. Formally, parts is the least set including and closed under projection and decryption.
The parts operator can be used to define the subterm relation ⊏:
is not regarded as occurring in {| | } unless is a part of . Similarly, analz is defined to be the least set including and closed under projection and decryption by known keys.
A protocol's behaviour is specified as the set of possible traces of events. A trace model is concrete and easy to explain. An event is of the form: Says , which means that send the message . For an event = Says , we define msgPart ≡ , sender ≡ , receiver ≡ to represent the message, sender and receiver of . Function initState specifies agent 's initial knowledge. Typically an agent's initial knowledge consists of its private key and the public keys of all agents.
The function knows describes the set of messages which can observe from the trace in addition to his initial knowledge. Formally, The set used formalises the notion of freshness. The set includes the set of the parts of the messages sent in the network as well as all messages held initially by any agent. The predicate regularOrig is to define a message originated by an honest agent. Formally, regularOrig ≡ ∀ .originates −→ / ∈ bad. Next we define a set of special lists: mutualDiffL. If ∈ mutualDiffL, , < length , and ∕ = , then we have ∕ = . Here is the -th element of the list .
inductive_set mutualDiffL::('a list) set where
We define single valued
B. Intruder model
We discuss anonymity properties based on observations of the intruder. In this section, we explain our intruder model. Dolev-Yao intruder model [9] is considered standard in the field of formal symbolic analysis of authentication or secrecy properties of security protocols. In this model the network is completely under the control of the intruder: all messages sent on the network are read by the intruder; all received messages on the network are created or forwarded by the intruder; the intruder can also remove messages from the network. However, in the analysis of anonymity protocols, we would like to adapt a weaker attacker model. We assume that the intruder is passive in the sense that he observes all network traffic, but does not actively modify the messages or inject new messages. He can analyze the messages he has observed, which is modelled by the operator analz. In later section, we will point out that some anonymity properties cannot be kept if we have the Dolev-Yao intruder model.
III. MESSAGE DISTINGUISHABILITY
In this section, we focus on modelling the ability for the agent to distinguish two received messages based on his knowledge. In principle, an agent can uniquely identify any plain-text message he observes. Furthermore, an agent can distinguish any encrypted message for which he possesses the decryption key, or which he can construct himself. 
IV. OBSERVATIONAL EQUIVALENCE
We first introduce the notion of observational equivalence between messages which is naturally defined as the negation of message distinguishability. If an agent cannot distinguish two messages and ′ , then the two messages are observationally equivalent to the agent. Obviously, observational equivalence between messages w.r.t. a knowledge set Know is reflexive, symmetric. Intuitively, we can lift observational equivalence to traces: two sequences of messages in two traces look the same to an agent if they are the same for the messages the agent understands and if a message in one sequence is observationally equivalent to the corresponding message in the other sequence w.r.t. the knowledge which the agent has obtained from the two traces. Besides the requirement of message matching, we also require that the sender and receiver of an event in a trace is the same as those of the corresponding event in the other sequence. • and ′ have the same length;
• For events and ′ , the senders and receivers of are the same as those of ′ .
• Furthermore, msgPart and msgPart ′ are observationally equivalent to each other w.r.t. the knowledge obtained after observing the two traces.
• At last single valued and single valued −1 guarantee that an agent cannot reinterpret an event differently. 
V. EPISTEMIC OPERATORS AND ANONYMITY PROPERTIES
Using the observational equivalence relations over a trace set of possible worlds, we can formally introduce epistemic operators [2] as follows:
constdefs box::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒ assertOfTrace⇒bool" "box A r rs Assert≡ ∀ r'.r'∈rs−→obsEquiv A r r' −→(Assert r')" constdefs diamond::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒ assertOfTrace⇒bool" "diamond A r rs Assert≡ ∃ r'.r'∈rs ∧obsEquiv A r r' ∧(Assert r')"
For notation convenience, we write |= □ for box , and |= ◇ for diamond . Note that is a predicate on a trace. Intuitively, |= □ means that for any trace ′ in , if ′ is observationally equivalent to for agent , then ′ satisfies the assertion . On the other hand, |= ◇ menas that there is a trace ′ in , ′ is observationally equivalent to for agent and ′ satisfies the assertion . Now we can formulate some information hiding properties in our epistemic language. We use the standard notion of an anonymity set: it is a collection of agents among which a given agent is not identifiable. The larger this set is, the more anonymous an agent is.
A. Sender anonymity
Suppose that is a trace of a protocol in which a message is originated by some agent. We say that provides sender anonymity with anonymity set w.r.t a set of possible runs in the view of if it satisfies:
constdefs senderAnomity::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒ trace⇒trace set⇒bool" "senderAnomity AS B m r rs≡ (∀ X.X:AS−→ r |=◇B rs (originates X m))"
Here, is the set of agents who are under consideration, and is the set of all the traces which can observe. Intuitively, this definition means that each agent in can originate in a trace of . Therefore, this means that cannot be sure of anyone who originates this message.
B. Unlinkability
We say that a trace provides unlinkability for user and a message w.r.t anonymity set if constdefs unlinkability::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒ trace⇒trace set⇒bool" "unlinkability AS A m r rs≡ (let P= X m' r. sends X m' r in (¬(r |=□ Spy rs (P A m)) ∧ (∀ X.X:AS −→r |=◇Spy rs (P A m)))"
where the left side of the conjunction means that the intruder is not certain that sent , while the right side means that every other user could have sent .
VI. CASE STUDY: ONION ROUTING PROTOCOL
A. Modeling the protocol
In our work, we model a simplified onion routing protocol system, composed of a user set and a router , with / ∈ . We also assume that each agent can send a message before the router launch a batch of forwarding process, and the router does not accept any message when it is forwarding messages.
inductive_set oneOnionSession::"nat⇒agent⇒trace set" for k::"nat" and M::"agent" where onionNil:
In this definition, there are four induction rules. Rule Nil specifies an empty trace. The other rules specify trace's extension with protocol steps. The ideas behind the other induction rules are illustrated as follows. More precisely,
• If the length of the current trace is less than , namely, is still in a receiving status, (or ) and are distinct, and both 0 and are fresh, then we can add an event
This step means that sends a message to which will be peeled and forwarded to by .
• If the length of the current trace is less than , and are distinct, and is fresh, then we can add an event Says {|Nonce | } pubK . This means that sends a dummy message to which will be simply discarded later.
• If the length of the current trace is greater than or equal to , namely, is in a forwarding status, a message {|Nonce 0 , Agent , {|Nonce | } pubK | } pubK has been received by the router, but the peeled onion {|Nonce | } pubK has not been forwarded, then we can add an event Says {|Nonce | } pubK . This step means that the router forwards the peeled message to .
B. Properties on protocol sessions
As mentioned in a previous section, whether two traces are observationally equivalent for an agent depends on the knowledge of the agent after his observation of the two traces. Therefore, we need to discuss some properties on the knowledge of the intruder. They are secrecy properties, and some regularity on the correspondence of the events in one protocol session. a) Secrecy properties.: If the router is honest, is also honest, and sends a message {|Nonce 0 , Agent , {|Nonce | } pubK | } pubK to , either 0 ∕ = or / ∈ bad, then Nonce 0 cannot be analyzed by the intruder.
Provided that both and are honest, and sends a dummy message {|Nonce 0 | } pubK to , then Nonce 0 cannot be analyzed by the intruder.
Lemma 2 [[ ∈ oneOnionSession
;
The following lemma is about the correspondence of two events in a trace . If the router forwards a message {|Nonce | } pubK , then there must exist an agent who has sent a message for some nonce
If {|Nonce | } pubK is a submessage of a message which sends to the router , then {|Nonce | } pubK is originated by .
Lemma 4
, an agent sends the router a message , then is not the router .
Since an agent is required to originate fresh nonces when he sends a message to the router, therefore if two events where agents send a message to the router , either two events are exactly the same, or nonces used in the two events are disjoint.
From Lemma 6, we can easily derive that once a nonce occurs in a message sent by an agent , then another agent cannot send a message containing the same nonce .
The message of each event in a trace of the protocol is unique, namely two messages in two events in this trace are different.
Lemma 8
(zip (map msgPart ) ) must be single valued if is in a trace of the onion routing protocol.
Lemma 9 [[ ∈ oneOnionSession
]] =⇒ single valued (zip (map msgPart ) )
C. Traces swapping two messages
By definition of sender anonymity, the proof strategy of such property is roughly as follows: fix an agent , we need to prove the existence of an observationally equivalent trace ′ w.r.t. a given trace , where both and ′ are some protocol sessions. Obviously, this means a construction of an observationally equivalent trace ′ . In this section, we discuss this construction method in details.
We define a function swap , which returns another trace ′ satisfying that the sender and receiver of any event ′ is the same as those in , but the sent message of ′ is For a trace of the onion routing protocol, Fig. 1 
